sanction or punishment and such extreme does not proceed in the specific civil sphere where, once a damage has occurred, the great problem consists, in fact, in pointing out the subject who must proceed with its reparation rather than imposing a sanction or punishment on the person causing the damage. Such theoretical construction undoubtedly had numerous social advantages being followed in Germany by authors such as ERZSBACH, BIENENFELD and ESSER. Thus, for LARENZ responsibility for risk was carried out through the generalization of special legislation related to rail transport, the circulation of motor vehicles or the imputation of liability for the simple possession of an animal 13 . In Italy, Art. 2050 of the Codice Civile is initialed «Responsabilità per l'esercizio di attività pericolose» 14 which constitutes an open structure since to establish if an activity is dangerous it is not enough to indicate that it is included in the special regulations, but it is considered dangerous activity that presents, by its nature or by the characters of the means employed, a relevant probability of damage or strong offensive potential, so that its determination in each case is made in concrete on the basis of common experience 15 ; whereas in Common Law jurisprudence, Strict Liability has long been referred to as claims for damages that are not necessarily based on fault 16 .
The doctrinal majority considers the change of the guiding principles of the Tort Law (going from the responsibility for fault to the restitution of the damage to favor the formulas pro damnato or favor debitoris in order to favor the damaged based on the notion that, therefore, generally, all the damages and risks that the modern social life favors should give rise to a compensation except when there is an extraordinary reason why the injured person should be relegated only to the damage) had as a result a certain tendency to socialize the risk that it has materialized in certain social protection systems -such as the one established by Social Security-; in certain market maneuvers (which transfer business risk to the public through manipulation of prices, including, in the amount of the product itself, the cost of the risk in the event of causing possible harm); in the requirement of civil liability insurance to be able to carry out certain dangerous activities (among others, the circulation of motor vehicles, the exercise of hunting or air navigation); in the introduction of economic aid of a reparative 13 Díez-Picazo, 2000, pp. 154-156. 14 According to which: "Chiunque cagiona danno ad altri nello svolgimento di un'attivita' pericolosa, per sua natura o per la natura dei mezzi adoperati, e'tenuto al risarcimento, se non prova di avere adottato tutte le misure idonee a evitare il danno". 15 Perlingieri & D´Amico, 2014, pp. 922-924 , pointing out that in order to be released from liability, the person carrying out the dangerous activity runs the burden of proving that he adopted all the appropriate measures to avoid the damage, understanding Italian jurisprudence this formula «in modo rigoroso».
16 Díez-Picazo, 2000, p. 157 . In fact, the Cap. V of the Principles of European Tort Law (PETL) is titled «Strict Liability». nature destined to certain injured groups (to which they respond today, for example, Law 32/1999, of 8 October, on solidarity with victims of terrorism or repealed RD 288/2003, of March 7, which approved the regulation of aid and reparations to victims of terrorism offenses); in the establishment of taxes to clean up the environment (as a sample it is worth citing Law 12/2014, of October 10, on the tax on the emission of nitrogen oxides into the atmosphere produced by commercial aviation, the tax on the emission of gases and particles into the atmosphere produced by the industry and of the tax on the production of electrical energy of nuclear origin); in the application of the classic CL system to legal persons (as it happens in the administrative sphere since the so-called patrimonial responsibility of the Administration is no more than the CL of the latter once it has overcome the old anglo-saxon principle of irresponsibility contained in the expression «The king can do no wrong» -understood as that the king or the Administration could not commit illicit-by virtue of the already repealed article 133 of the regulation of the Law of forced expropriation, approved by Decree of April 26, 1957 and articles 40 to 42 of the also repealed Law, of July 20, 1957, on the Legal System of the State Administration) or in the creation of funds borne by groups dedicated to certain irrigation activities or, even, by the Government -what is the same, for everyone-in the event that the legally established CL was not enough to cover the eventual compensation for damages (which is reflected in the current for example, in Art. 5 of Law 12/2011, of May 27, on civil liability for nuclear damage or produced by radioactive materials).
It must be admitted that in Spain the adaptation and subsequent evolution of the initial system of CL through fault has proceeded from the jurisprudence because, starting from the same Art. 1902 CC, the decisions of our courts have raised socializing doctrines of responsibility for risk (in a singular way in the sine of business activities), investment -or, better, modification-of the onus probandi or burden of proof (De las Heras, 2005, p. 51) contained in Art. 217 of the Civil Procedure Law 17 (CPL, which our courts relate to the risk or danger of the activity carried out by the subject so that it will correspond to him to prove his diligence in each specific case), of disproportionate damages (which implies, after all, a variant of the rule res ipsa loquitur -that is, that things speak for themselves-based on presumptions of guilt allowed by Art. 386 CPL 18 ) or, finally, demanding a lot of criteria of diligence higher than can be derived from the same legal texts (as could be the content in Art.
1104 CC) 19 . Consequence of this is noted that, sometimes, the element of guilt is lost in the sphere of the CL so that, under this perspective, the modern Tort Law finds its true ratio essendi in the need to protect the person and their goods (not only patrimonial, but also moral and corporal) against the risks that social progress entails and the unavoidable increase of dangerousness, moving away from the notion of sanction for the production of an illicit act or, as the case may be, unlawful. DÍEZ-PICAZO maintains that risk liability is a jurisprudential right created praeter legem by the courts without any support in legal texts which (Díez-Picazo, 2011, p. 282) , in our opinion, is not entirely accurate due to Arts. 217 and 386 CPL in relation to the Art. 1902 CC, as will be seen, this responsibility has been developed by our courts and, therefore, is based on the aforementioned precepts.
The current importance of the Tort Law is to symbolize that tool of safeguarding the personal sphere through which the transgressions that affect the rights of the personality in its numerous projections are repaired, thus, the first two ordinals of Art. Since the last century we have witnessed a change in the CL field because the main protagonist is not the one that causes harm to another (Art. 1902 CC), but rather is the victim or harmed by the damage the illegality of the damage itself being more important than the illegality, sometimes imaginary, of the behavior that provokes it.
In summary, the main function of CL is not to punish unlawful acts but to compensate the injustice of the damages (restorative function derived from restitutio in integrum), that is, the main purpose of CL is to repair the damage caused and not, necessarily the moral reproach to whom it is obliged to compensate, although, sometimes, it is also carried out (sanctioning function). For this reason, along with this basic function, the CL also fulfills a preventive function of future damages (prevention function), allowing its rules to indicate the degree of diligence or care that different agents must observe in each sector (as opposed to what reprobation and that we all dislike the fact that produce, but that the fault is not in the damage but in the behavior that causes it, which is different. 19 The fault or negligence of the debtor consists in the omission of that diligence that demands the nature of the obligation and corresponds to the circumstances of the persons, the time and the place. When the obligation does not express the diligence that has to be rendered in its fulfillment, the one that would correspond to a «good father of a family» will be demanded. happens in EE.UU. thanks to punitive damages) and whoever is declared civilly liable must not pay the victim or injured party an additional amount, regardless of compensation for the damage, as a private fine (Parra, 2011, p. 362) . However, there is some exception as happens, for example, with Art. 164 of RDLeg 8/2015, of October 30, approving the Consolidated Text of the General Law of Social Security that establishes a surcharge of the economic amounts derived from an accident at work or occupational disease -in charge of the offending businessman-if the damages derive from the violation of norms on occupational safety or health (therefore, in addition to the repair of the damage is also pursued sanction the damage and also prevent future accidents). This evolution of the classic CL system in Spain has found concreteness in numerous legal texts that favor and simplify the compensation of damages to the victim through a system of strict liability. At the same time, due to the increase of special laws on damages, the very broad Art. 1902 CC is taking a more residual nature although, both doctrinally and jurisprudentially, it is still considered as a starting point and foundation of our entire CL system (Beltrán & Orduña et al, 2010, p. 191) .
In this displacement of Art. 1902 CC has also influenced the preference of the so-called CL ex delicto (aforementioned, Arts. 109 and ss. CP) and the patrimonial responsibility of the Administration (established, by all, in Art. 106.2 SC 20 from which derives its patrimonial responsibility that, in reality, is civil in spite of its legal name -or nomen iuris-) when the production of damages is directly imputed to it or it turns out to be responsible for those caused by the personnel at its service.
However, the criteria for the objective imputation of harm should not be confused (which serve to examine in any CL class, whether subjective or objective, the damages that can be attributed to a certain conduct, that is, criteria that are used to solve issues related to the causal relationship between the conduct and the damage caused) with the objective criterion of the risk used to attribute to an individual the obligation to repair damages that were not caused by his fault or negligence or, at most, not only by its exclusive fault, for what the CL that derives from it will be objective or quasi-objective, also existing risks and others that are voluntarily accepted by the injured party.
20 Individuals, under the terms established by law, will be entitled to be compensated for any injury they suffer in any of their assets and rights, except in cases of force majeure, provided that the injury is a consequence of the operation of the services public.
It is then noted that objective liability and responsibility for risk do not turn out to be equivalent expressions in full -despite the similarity, on numerous occasions, of its consequences-21 and that, ultimately, the fault of the agent in the provocation of the damage has not been displaced, on the contrary, in the CL.
ABOUT LIABILITY FOR RISK.
The CL by risk is the creation of jurisprudential doctrine (Art. 1.6 CC) 22 based on the conception that the one that originates a risk and benefits from it must respond to its consequences, which is traditionally reflected in the formulas ibi emolumentum ubi onus or cuius commodum, eius incommodum what applies to many claims for damages resulting from work accidents, hazardous activities or defective products (Parra, 2011, p. 390) . This CL by risk emanates from the technical progress of modern life that does not coincide, without more, with a responsibility without fault although the latter is not always necessary because the fault or negligence of the agent is not essential in this type of responsibility. In contrast to the classic theory that there is no responsibility without fault, it is admitted that damages arising from certain activities or behaviors, even if they are lawful and tolerated, must be attributed to those who have generated, through them, risks or dangers for third parties.
In Germany, ESSER defined CL by risk as the obligation to respond for the danger posed by itself, that is, the imputation of damages to the area of responsibility of the person obliged to repair it through the principle of the control of danger and the characteristics of the specific risks inherent (Santos, 1973, pp. 609-610) . This expands the traditional sphere of CL, increasing the repair possibilities of the damage produced, tending, consequently, to increase the sense of responsibility. Thus, the doctrinal majority and the legislation itself admit a progressive «substantivity of responsibility for misfortunes (für Unglück)» based on «facilities and behaviors to which a risk to the community is attached» (Santos, 2000, p. 588).
The German doctrine also distinguishes liability for risk of the call «Eingriffshaftung» or responsibility for lawful and permitted attacks or transgressions where the basis of the duty to compensate lies in commutative justice -and not in the unlawfulness of the act or even in the attribution of a certain risk-that the one who protects his interest to the detriment of the right 21 Santos, 1973, p. 610 , it points out the non-coincidence between objective liability, without fault or risk, noting that even DEUTSCH, starting from the difference between subjective imputation (supported by the individual's fault) and objective imputation (which covers the assumptions of presumption of fault, the adequate causality and responsibility for risk) based on the «collective existence of man, rightly excludes liability for causation of civil liability rules».
22 "…The jurisprudence will complement the legal system with the doctrine that, repeatedly, establish the Supreme Court to interpret and apply the law, custom and general principles…". of a third party, even if permitted, must compensate the injured party being an example of this Eingriffshaftung the patrimonial responsibility (Santos, 1973, p. 611) of the Administration derived from the mentioned Art. 106.2 SC. The risk liability is based on a principle of positive imputation in which, although the criterion of objectivity based on the creation of a risk prevails, it does not rule out the lack of voluntariness with respect to the fact that causes the damage. The risk criterion, in general, covers a double meaning, on the one hand, from an economic perspective it is applicable to the damages caused by performing a lucrative activity carried out as a company (that is, in a continuous and organized manner) in whose sphere the damages are considered inevitable but foreseeable -and hence the mandatory obligation of insurance imposed by the legislator-while, on the other hand, the risk is similar to the danger serving then to base the compensation of the damages caused by the deployment of activities, whether or not they have a lucrative purpose, which, being themselves unsafe, entail a high probability of causing harmful consequences despite not being carried out continuously or organized (Atienza, 2015, pp. 576-577) . In this respect the PETL initiate their Cap. V (signed «Strict liability») seeking to delimit those activities that are considered «Abnormally dangerous activities» establishing in his Art.
5:101: "(1) A person who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is strictly liable for damage characteristic to the risk presented by the activity and resulting from it. (2) An activity is abnormally dangerous if a) it creates a foreseeable and highly significant risk of damage even when all due care is exercised in its management and b) it is not a matter of common usage. (3) A risk of damage may be significant having regard to the seriousness or the likelihood of the damage. (4) This Article does not apply to an activity which is specifically subjected to strict liability by any other provision of these Principles or any other national law or international convention".
In a more skeptical way, Albaladejo considers that risk liability is not a third kind of liability that exists alongside fault and objective liability, but is one or the other, depending on the case. Thus, it maintains that it will be objective in the cases established by law in which the person, being or not guilty, is liable for the damages caused by the risk he created. In other hypotheses it will be at fault if, when creating the risk, it is presumed that the damage has been caused by the guilty behavior of the person responsible, but the responsibility is based on the production of the damage caused by the risk created and the fault of the agent. No matter how much the fault is presumed, the agent can be released from liability if, against presumption, he proves that he was not guilty; and if this demonstration is not admitted, we will be in the presence of the strict liability (call for risk) 23 .
As it could not be otherwise, it has been our jurisprudence that defines the meaning and scope of risk liability as follows:
1º. The mere creation of a risk is not enough to declare, without further ado, the responsibility of the one who creates it, not even when the person carrying out the activity pursues a lucrative purpose. In order to declare someone responsible for the damage, the guilt that characterizes the subjective responsibility is also required, an essential presupposition of our order in accordance with what is established in Art. 1902 CC with the provisos, of course, legally provided. The production of a damage by materializing the risk created is not equivalent to a demonstration of the agent's fault (otherwise it would be an objective responsibility or result). Consequently, whether or not the agent is at fault (Art. 1104 CC)
constitutes a legal assessment derived from comparing the conduct that causes an injury and that required by the order. The fault, therefore, is equivalent to a behavior not adjusted to the models of expertise and diligence required according to the circumstances of people, time and place, keeping in mind that the simple observance of the regulatory standards of care or safety do not eliminate the possible fault of the agent.
2º.-The term risk has several meanings which is of great importance to determine the degree of diligence required in each specific case, therefore, if the risk generated by the behavior displayed can be classified as usual or ordinary (where the so-called general risk of the life in society that can give rise to damages not attributable to anyone because, after all, risks exist in all areas of life, even in the case of tiny or unqualified risks) it is not possible to demand extraordinary skill and diligence, also taking into account if the injured party has voluntarily assumed the risk of a specific activity 24 . On the other hand, when a risk is created higher than what is considered normal (as is generally the case when carrying out a qualifying dangerous activity), the rules relating to the required expertise and diligence are 23 Albaladejo, 2003, pp.13-14. 24 As an example we can cite the case of an accident due to the practice of diving in which the applicant, after receiving a theoretical class taught by the instructor, suffers after the immersion dental damage for which he claims. The Judgment of the Provincial Court of Las Palmas of June 11, 2007, Section 5, García de Yzaguirre, dismisses the claim stating (in its Ground of Law 2) that in the realization of sports activities freely assumed by seniors of age, the theory of risk and objective liability should not be applied should the requirements of subjective responsibility or fault be met.». In another case involving golf, the Supreme Court Judgment of March 9, 2006, Civil, Seijas Quintana states that the idea of risk, based on the exploitation of activities, industries, instruments or hazardous materials, and the benefits that are cannot be transferred to sports, not organizational, to base a liability regime other than the fault. See also Fernández Costales, 2000, pp. 227-249. 
REFERENCE TO THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF LIABILITY FOR RISK.
We can highlight some of the various legally established liability assumptions that respond to the demands of modern life (susceptible to causing greater risks) so that the Law adequately interprets social conscience, increasing the cases in which, as an exception to the general rule that presides in the civil sphere (both in the CC and outside it) «this objective liability is accepted under the protection of those who suffer the damages that the aforementioned risks may cause» (Albaladejo, 2011, p. 940 damage was caused by force majeure or by the fault of the person who suffered it. As it is clear from the precept, as a general rule, the possessor who uses the animal generating the damages is held responsible. As it is clear from the norm, as a general rule, the possessor who uses the animal that generates the damages is held liable -article considered to be the most severe and «demanding of the civil text in order to claim responsibility for the production of damages»-(Ramos, 2000, p. 674); not enough, in principle, the mere possession of the animal but the jurisprudence requires that the possessor obtains a service or benefit of any kind for the use of the animal -so that if a certain service or benefit obtains a person other than that which is the then the animal owner would be the one who answered-; however, the possessor of the animal has also come to understand who has «his government and who is responsible for its surveillance» 27 , being indifferent to the type of animal in question «domestic or wild or fierce» provided that the animal «is subject to the ownership or control of someone» (Ramos, 2000, p. 677). If there were several possible responsible for the damages caused, they will respond civilly and jointly, all of them 28 . Regarding the owner of the animal, given the faculties that derive from their right of ownership, if the facts that prove otherwise are not proven, it can be reasonably presumed that it will be the one who responds to being the de facto holder of the animal and, in addition, who is served of the. In any case they are excluded, for the purposes of CL, the simple servants of the possession (as, for example, the employee who walks a dog or the workers of the agricultural entrepreneur) 29 .
As you can see this CL is objective or no fault, in particular, is a responsibility arising from the risk caused by particularly dangerous things such as domestic animals, so that it is considered that who has control and get the benefits "that the animal reports, it must also bear the cost of the damage it causes -ubi emolumentum ibi onus-30 . Only exoneration of CL due to force majeure or exclusive fault of the aggrieved in the production of the damage, although in some occasion only the latter has been taken into account in order to reduce the indemnity quatum.
27 Lacruz et al, 2002 , p. 511, as well ALBALADEJO, 2011 963 -for which any possession or use that corresponds to a person" on the animal "makes him / her liable, as long as it lasts, for any damage caused (exempting the owner from liability). Likewise Atienza, 2015, p. 596, nevertheless, this last author denies CL of whom, p. eg, put a horseshoe to a horse indicating Lacruz that, in this case, it is incumbent on the possessor a custody obligation. 28 In this direction the Art. 9:101 PETL: " (1) 
Damages caused by things thrown or fallen from a house: The CL derived from such damages is contemplated in Art. 1910 CC: "The head of the family that lives in a house or part of it, is responsible for the damages caused by the things that are thrown or fall from
it". The precept is limited to damage caused by objects that are thrown or fall and do not obey construction defects or lack of repairs since for these latter assumptions other rules are foreseen (specifically, Arts. 1907 and 1909 CC based on a subjective CL or fault). Regarding the expression «head of the family» the jurisprudence understands who, by any title, dwells a dwelling as a main character with respect to the people who live with it forming a family or another social group, so that if it is a family they will be parents, outside of this case all adults who inhabit the house should be considered as such if all are situated on an equal footing 32 (eg, brothers, friends or students who live together). If there were several «heads of family» they all respond in solidarity. The majority of the doctrine and jurisprudence consider that the responsibility of such precept is of an objective nature (that is to say, by risk), without prejudice to the fact that the head of the family can later claim against whoever is the true cause of the damage. It is enough for the plaintiff, therefore, to prove that he has suffered damage by an object thrown or fallen from a dwelling and the «head of the family» will only be exonerated from CL if he proves force majeure or the sole fault of the victim 33 .
The -In the event of damages to persons, the responsible driver can only be exonerated when he proves that the damage is due, exclusively, "... to the conduct or negligence of the injured party or to force majeure foreign to the driving or operation of the vehicle; the defects of the vehicle or the breakage or failure of any of its parts or mechanisms "will not be considered as is also granted to the injured parties or their heirs for the satisfaction of the damages and losses (paragraph 2, Art. 7.1). In accordance with Art. 3 TRLRCSCVM the omission of the duty to subscribe this compulsory insurance entails the prohibition to circulate, the deposit or seal of the vehicle with charge to its holder plus a monetary sanction. however, turned out to be a person who was crouching and who left badly wounded, being appreciated an unequal concurrence of blame in the production of damages. With quotation of abundant jurisprudence it declares its Legal Basis 2º that to the reckless action of making a shot without verifying that the objective is a hunting animal is added, in addition, the fact of being shot at a distance of 30 visual meters with a rifle of great caliber provided with a visor that, logically, approaches the field of vision and, with it, the object on which it shoots.
Damages caused by the
Therefore, it is considered unjustifiable for an expert hunter such as the defendant and even any other person who wields a rifle to shoot at such a short distance from the target without fully and undoubtedly verifying that it was a hunting animal it is indifferent that the wounded man was crouching or standing, being reprehensible the behavior for the simple fact of shooting on an object that is only identified as a «brown spot», so the fact of finding the victim stopped, crouching, walking or stop does not serve as an excuse to diminish or increase the negligence committed, because the slightest requirement of human prudence advises not to make any attempt at «something» about which one does not have the absolute certainty that it is an animal of hunting.
The same ruling highlights, with abundant jurisprudence, the failure of the defendant to Regarding the reversal of the burden of proof in hunting accidents, this judgment reminds us of the relevance of liability for fault as the risk does not constitute the only reason for the obligation to repair the damage and although Spanish civil jurisprudence has evolved making objective civil liability said change is made moderately, recommending an inversion of the burden of proof and highlighting the required diligence, depending on the circumstances of the case, but without converting the risk into the sole basis of the obligation to compensate and without excluding so absolute the classic principle of culpability, so that these solutions are requested by the increase of dangerous activities proper to technological development and by the principle of putting in charge of those who obtain the benefit, compensation for the damages suffered. In summary, that the objectifying tendency of responsibility needs a conclusive proof regarding the nexus between the behavior of the agent and the production of the damage, in such a way that makes clear the guilt that obliges to repair it and this need for justification can not be invalidated by an application of risk theory, the objectification of responsibility or the reversal of the burden of proof. 2º.-In the case of any other nuclear damage, during a period of 10 years since the nuclear accident took place.
Damages arising from Air
In any event, the action to demand compensation for damages caused by a nuclear accident prescribes 3 years from the moment the injured party became aware of the nuclear damage and the responsible operator or, as the case may be, from the moment in which it was due reasonably have knowledge of it. Those who deduct indemnification action within the previous periods "...may make a complementary claim in the event that the damage is aggravated after these periods, and provided that no final judgment has been issued by the competent court" (nº 2 and 3 of its Art. 15).
It is worth quoting the judgment of the Supreme Court nº 1/2002, of January 16, Civil
Chamber, Villagómez Rodil issued (before Law 12/2011) within the framework of a claim for damages caused in a fish farm when the defendant uses the Tajo River to cool a nuclear power plant causing an increase in the temperature of the waters that caused the mass mortality of the trouts produced by the plaintiff. The Court considers that the origin of the damage was established, the causal relationship with the result produced is not presented as a probabilistic judgment, but true, without forgetting that the nuclear power plants represent in themselves a notorious risk that imposes the adoption of all the measures, even exceeding the regulations, to avoid that its operation is negative to people or things. Once the damage has occurred, the intensity of the serious risk acts in line with a quasi-objectification, imposing on the person responsible the justification that, in the exercise of the activity, even with the pertinent administrative authorizations, he acted with all diligence within his reach and even extreme.
the measures, which could well lead in this case to a decision to reduce production or to control it properly in the face of a serious ecological catastrophe, because in these cases we can not speak of excesses in the forecast, but rather of «imperative needs». As an example, Sentence nº 1200/2008, of December 16, Civil, Section 1, Salas Carceller issued as a result of an explosion produced in a building through which several floors collapsed, several of its occupants were injured and appeared one of them died among the rubble. As a result of the accident, the widow sued the butane gas supplier, her insurer and the distribution company of the cylinders that opposed, alleging lack of proof regarding the necessary causal link between the damage and the existence of an imputable action. The Supreme Court, without even mentioning the legal texts concerning the consumer, declares that the probative claim of the alleged perpetrators contradicts jurisprudence that develops the theory of risk or quasi-objective liability because, precisely, this theory is based on the fact that the injured origin of the damage -in this case the explosion of gas-is fulfilled its evidentiary burden to derive to whoever created the risk the burden of proving that the harmful result is not a consequence of its performance, but of the interference of strange elements such as the own action of the victim or force majeure. As a result, this Judgment points out two aspects of liability for risk: «…the first, that can only go to imputation titles of responsibility based on criteria other than the subjective, with the subsequent consequence in the procedural order of the investment of the burden of the test, in cases where there is a dangerous activity that involves a considerably abnormal risk in relation to the average standards; and the second, that, in any case, whatever the title of attribution of responsibility, it is necessary that the necessary causality is met, according to criteria of adequacy or efficiency, which makes possible the attribution of the damage». Therefore, no violation of 
